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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTIONDETERMINABLE FEE
A 1929 deed which conveyed land from private individuals
to a city provided : ". . . . In the event said lands . . . shall not
be kept and maintained as a park . . . for use by the white race
only ... the lands hereby conveyed shall revert in fee simple ...."
In 1955 a declaratory judgment was sought to determine the validity of the restriction and reverter clauses. Held: the operation of such language created a fee simple determinable with a
possibility of reverter. Since such reversion would be automatic
and would not require any judicial enforcement by state courts,
negroes who desired to use the park facilities would not be deprived of equal protection of the laws by state action.1
The instant case is of interest not only because of the court's
holding; but also, because of the presence of two other problems
which the court does not discuss. First, is the maintenance of
the park by the city an action of the state which is within the
proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment?2 Second, is the restriction illegal?
Prior to the decisions of 19483 the problem of land transactions involving privately imposed racial restrictions had not been
viewed as a proqlem of constitutional law. Rather, racial restrictions upon the use and occupancy of land were enforced upon
various grounds.4 However, the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer 5
1 Charlotte Park· and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 88 S.E.2d 114
(N.C. 1955).
2 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: " . . . . No State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
3 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948).
4 Edwards v. West Woodridge Theater Co., 55 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir.
1931) (restriction does not deprive citizen of any constitutional right);
Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1946) (give effect
to intention of parties); Dooley v. Savannah Bank and Trust Co., 199
Ga. 353, 34 S.E.2d· 522 (1945) (protection of property value to which
restriction applied); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217
(1918) (not an unlawful restraint or against public policy); Queens-
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dearly established the proposition that specific enforcement of
such agreements by state courts is prohibited by the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Likewise, if a state court awards damages for breach
of a covenant restricting the use and occupancy of real property
to persons of the Caucasian race, non-Caucasians a.re deprived
of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6
The deed in the case at hand is not, as in Shelley v. Kraemer,
a contract between private individuals; rather, the deed here provides that the city maintain the lands as a park. This provision
puts the city in the position of discriminating against non-Caucasians. A city is a political subdivision of the state.7 Thus, any
action taken by the city is an action of the state.8
It is submitted that had the court considered this aspect of
the problem it could only have rendered a judgment that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the city from maintaining a
park which discriminates against any race. Such a restriction
is illegal; thus, it should be declared void and the fee of the first
taker rendered absolute. 9 Validity at time of inception does not
legitimatize a restriction which is subsequently declared to be
illegal.1° Thus, the result would not be altered even if it were
argued that such racial restrictions were not held to be illegal at
the time of the conveyance.
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borough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915) (liberty
of contract).
5 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry., 196 U.S. 539
(1905); Texas Nat. Guard Armory Board v. l\IcCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126
S.W.2d 627 (1939); Streat v. Vermilya, 268 l\Iich. 1, 255 N.W. 604
(1934); Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 134 So. 205 (1931).
s George v. City of Portland, 114 Ore. 418, 235 Pac. 681 (1925).
9 Cf. VI American Law of Property § 26.34 (Supp. 1954).
Clifton
v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (here it is not clear
whether the court construed the condition as a condition subsequent
with a right of re-entry or a determinable fee with a possibility of reverter); Ruhland v. King, 154 Wis. 545, 143 N.W. 681 (1913).
10 See Board of Comm'rs of l\Iahoning County v. Young, 59 Fed. 96
(6th Cir. 1893); Scovill v. l\Icl\Iahon, 62 Conn. 378, 26 Atl. 479 (1892).
6
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